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This paper examines expected return information embedded in investors’ information
acquisition activity. Using a novel dataset containing investors’ access of company fil-
ings through SEC’s EDGAR system, we reverse engineer their expectations over future
payoffs and show that the abnormal number of IPs searching for firms’ financial state-
ments strongly predict future returns. The return predictability stems from investors
allocating more effort to firms with improving fundamentals and following exogeneous
shock to underpricing. A long-short portfolio based on our measure of information
acquisition activity generate monthly abnormal return of 80 basis points and does not
reverse over the long-run. In addition, the return predictability is stronger among firms
with larger and lengthy financial filings that are more costly to process. Collectively,
these findings support theoretical predictions that costly information acquisition re-
veals the value of information.
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1 Introduction
Information acquisition and dissemination is key to understanding asset price movements
and market efficiency. When information is costly to acquire and price is only partially
revealing, economic agents will expend resouces and effort to become informed (Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980); Verrecchia (1982)), and in doing so, move prices closer to fundamental
value. A central prediction from theories of costly information acquisition is that more
investors will choose to become informed when they perceive greater benefits from doing so,
holding the cost of information acquisition constant. Although theories offer clear and rich
predictions, empirical evidence on the relation between information acquisition behavior and
value of information is sparse in fiancial markets, potentially due to the difficulty of directly
measuring information acquistion activities of investors.
In this paper, we take advantage of a novel dataset containing investors’ access of regu-
latory filings through SEC’s EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval)
system to study the implications of information acquisition activities on firm value. Because
EDGAR system is the main sources of firms’ regulatory filings and SEC maintains a log
file of all activity performed by users on EDGAR, we are able to directly observe investors’
information acquisition activity for a broad cross-section of firms over more than 10 year
sample period.
Our research objectives are two-fold in this paper. First, we examine the determinants
of investors’ information acquisition through EDGAR website. Motivated by theories of in-
formation acquisition1, we posit that information acquistion activities should be negatively
related to the cost of gathering information and positively related to the value of information.
To this end, we use the number of unique IP addresses searching for SEC filings through
EDGAR as proxy for investors’ information acquisition. We then run cross-sectional re-
gression of our information acquisition proxy on several firm characteristics associated with
information cost. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with higher investor visibility and
attention, and better information environment will attract more information acquisition.
1There is a large theorectical literature on information acquisition, e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Verrecchia (1982), Hellwig (1980), Admati (1985), Mele and Sangiorgi
(2015).
as these stocks are more accessible in investors’ mind and less costly to analyze. We also
expect investors to have stronger incentive to acquire information on firms with higher va-
lution uncertainty. Using firm size to proxy for investor visibility, trading volume to proxy
for investor attention (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001); Barber and Odean (2007)),
analyst coverage to proxy for information environment (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)), and
idiosyncratic volatility to proxy for valuation uncertainty (Zhang (2006)), we find evidence
consistent with theories. These four firm characteristics explain 55% of cross-sectional varia-
tion of information acquisition across firms. Further tests show that information acquisition
through EDGAR also increases following negative past return performance and among firms
with lower institutonal ownership, but these additional characteristics does not significantly
improve the explanatory power over our baseline model.
After implementing a simple characteristic-based model of expected information acqui-
sition, we proceed to examine our second research question. That is, abnormal level of
information acquisition should be positively related to the expected benefits of trading on
information. This is based on the simple premise that when attention-constrained investors
decide how to allocate their time and effort, they will have a strong preference for firms
with the largest price appreciation or depreciation potential. In reality, due to short-sale
constraints, investors will more likely engage in costly information acquisition when the
expected return of a stock is positive.
To test this, we extract the part of number of IPs unexplained by firm characteristics
to reverse engineer investors’ expectation over future payoffs. Consistent with the idea that
information acquisition embeds the value of information, we show that the abnormal number
of IPs (denoted as AIP) requesting EDGAR filings strongly predict subsequent stock returns.
An equal-weighted, monthly rebalanced, long-short strategy that buys stocks in highest decile
of AIP and sells stocks in the lowest decile of AIP generates 52 to 82 basis points per month
after adjusting for the Carhart (1997) four factors and highly significant. Adjusting for the
recently proposed factor models–the Fama and French (2016) five-factor model, the Hou,
Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model, or the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) mispricing factor
model–does not affect the return spread of the long/short portfolio much. The abnormal
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return of AIP strategy is much weaker for value-weighted portfolios. The high-minus-low
AIP strategy is only around 30 basis points per monthly and mostly insignificant. This is
expected given short-sale constraint is less binding among big stocks, so the direction of
the information contained in AIP is more ambiguous for big stocks. Using several proxies of
short-sale constraints, we confirm that the positive expected return information embedded in
information acquistion is more pronounced among stocks that are difficult to short ex-ante.
The return predictability associated with abnormal number of IPs persists for two quar-
ters, and does not reverse in the subsequent months. The persistence in return predictability
alleviates concerns that our findings is driven by temporary price pressure caused by noise
traders that reverse over the long-run (Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011)).
In a Fama-MacBeth regression setting, we confirm that AIP has additional explanatory
power for future stock returns when we control for the standard cross-sectional return predic-
tors such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, short-term reversal, idiosyncratic
volatility, turnover and institutional ownership. The return predictability of AIP is also
not affected by alternative explanations such as post-earnings announcement drift, earnings
announcement premium and investor disagreement. Looking into different types of EDGAR
filings, we find the return predictability of AIP comes mainly from those searching for firms’
annual accounting report 10-K (AIP 10K). As gathering and analyzing 10-K report is more
costly than other SEC filings and more reflecting delibrate information acquisition behav-
ior, the stronger predictability of AIP 10K is consistent with theories of costly information
acquisition. To further substantialize our argument, we use the file size and word count of
10-Ks as proxy for the complexity of financial disclosure (Loughran and McDonald (2014)),
and find return predictability of AIP is indeed stronger among firms with large and lengthy
10-Ks.
Having established the robustness of the return predictability of abnormal number of IPs,
we test the sources of return predictability. The underlying assumption in this paper is that
investors rationally allocate more effort and resources towards underpriced stocks with high
expected return. As mispricing implies the separation of stock prices from firms’ fundamen-
tal value, we conjecture two non-mutually exclusive channels through which investors can
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identify mispricing. The first channel is that investors’ information acquisition activity re-
veals their favorable expectation of firms’ fundamental performance that are yet to be priced
in market. Consistent with the first channel, we find AIP strongly predicts future change of
firms’ quarterly Return-on-Assets and analyst consensus forecast, after controlling for past
profitability and other determinants of firms’ fundamental performance. A second channel
is that investors identify mispricing by observing changes in stock prices due to exogeneous
reasons. Supporting the second channel, we show the abnormal number of IPs searching for
EDGAR filings increses significantly for firms experiencing mutual fund outflow-induced sell-
ing pressure. Taken together, our evidence suggest that investors expand greater resources
and effort towards undervalued stocks and these findings are much more difficult to reconcile
with alternative explanations such as omitted risk factor or changes in investor visibility
(Merton (1987))2.
Finally, we provide some suggestive evidence on the types of investors conducting in-
formed searches on firms’ fundamentals through EDGAR. We show that abnormal number
of IPs positively predicts net purchases by hedge funds in the following quarter. In contrast,
AIP does not have predictability for net purchases by mutual fund managers. These results
are consistent with the idea that investors searching for financial filings through EDGAR
are more sophisticated than those searching through Google search engine, and hedge funds
may potentially be part of these sophisticated investors.3
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, our results offer strong
empirical evidence supporting theories of information acquisition that costly information
acquisition is positively related to the expected benefits of information. Using the novel
EDGAR log file dataset, we construct a direct measure of investors’ information acquisition
activity, and show its strong predictabilty for firms’ future returns and fundamentals. Du
(2015) shows that the number of web visits to SEC filings of insider trades predicts post-
filing stock return in the short-run. Although similar in spirit, our paper differs as we
2Alternative explanations based on omitted risk factor or changes in invesor base all work through
discount-rate channel, while the return predictability of AIP operates (partially) through cashflow chan-
nel.
3Drake, Quinn, and Thornock (2017) document that EDGAR users tend to have higher eductation level
and more likely to work in major cities with more accounting and finance jobs.
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study a much broader sample of SEC regulatory filings and longer horizon returns. We
also test the channels underlying the return predictability results. Using EDGAR search
data, Cohen et al.(2017) document that mutual funds tend to track a particular set of firms
and insiders, and their tracked trades generate abnormal performance. Lee and So (2017)
study the information content of analysts’ coverage decisions and show the abnormal number
of analyst coverage positively predict future firm performance. By extracting all internet
users’ information acquisition activities through EDGAR site, our measure captures the
expected return information embedded in the collective behavior of a much larger set of
market participants–millions of unique users. In addition, analysts’ incentives are found to
be distorted by generating trading commissions for their brokerage houses or currying favor
with firm management (Ke and Yu (2006)), while these distortions are less likely among
EDGAR users. Empirically, we show the return predictability of AIP is not affected after
controlling for analyst coverage proxies.
Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on the effect of investor attention
and information acquisition on asset prices and capital market efficiency. Da, Engelberg,
and Gao (2011) show that retail investors’ attention as captured by Google search volume
causes transitory price pressures on attention-grabbing stocks. Using news searching activity
via Bloomberg terminal as proxy for institutional investors’ attention, Ben-Rephael, Da,
and Israelsen (2017) find that institutional attention faciliates the timely incorporation of
fundamental information into asset prices. More related to our study, Drake, Roulstone,
and Thornock (2015) show that EDGAR-based information acquisition affects the pricing
of earnings-related news. These papers all examine the effect of information acquisition on
the pricing of public announced news. Our paper is different as we directly infer investors’
private expectation of firm value through their collective actions.
Finally, our work contributes to the emerging literature on extracting intelligence latent
in the collective ”wisdom of crowds”. Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) find evidence that
investors’ social media posts help predict stock return. Lee, Ma, and Wang (2015) show that
investors’ co-search pattern via EDGAR website could help identify peer firms better than
traditional industry benchmark. Huang (2016) finds that consumer opinion expressed on
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firms’ products in Amazon.com contain value-relevant information about firm fundamentals
and stock prices. Similarly, Green, Huang, Wen, and Zhou (2017) document employer re-
views on Glassdoor reveals valuable information about their employers’ fundamentals. Our
paper is complementary to the above mentioned studies as we infer agents’ expectation not
via what they ”say”, but through what they actually ”do”.
Our results that information acquisition activity predicts future returns do not imply
market is inefficient. As pointed out by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), a fully efficient market
where prices instantaneously reflect all available information cannot sustain an equilbrium
when information is costly to acquire and analyze. Rather, our evidence is mostly consistent
with the idea of ”efficiently inefficient markets” (Pedersen (2015)), where competition among
investors makes market almost efficient, but the market remains so inefficient so that these
investors are compensated for their costs of acquiring information.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, presents
summary statistics and examines the determinants of information acquisition. Section 3
shows that abnormal level of information acquisition reveals investors’ expectation over fu-
ture return. Section 4 tests the channels underlying the return predictability results. Section
5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Sample Construction
Our IP search volume data comes from Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)
EDGAR log file database which records all website search traffic for SEC filings since 2003.4
Each search record contains information on user’s unique Internet Protocal (IP) address
(anonymized)5, timestamp, searched company identified by Central Index Key (CIK) and
searched specific filing identified by the unique SEC accession number.6 Following Lee, Ma,
4The data is available for download at https://www.sec.gov/data/edgar-log-file-data-set.html.
5The EDGAR log file dataset provides the first three octets of the IP address with the fourth octet
obfuscated with a 3 character string that preserves the uniqueness of the last octet without revealing the
full identity of the IP.
6The detailed log file record elements are described at https://www.sec.gov/files
/EDGAR variables FINAL.pdf
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and Wang (2015) and Ryans (2017), we firstly filter the raw log data to eliminate the re-
quests made by robots or by automated webcrawlers since such massive and indiscriminative
requests are uninformativeness for our research question.7 Next, we match CIK in EDGAR
log filings to that in COMPUSTAT to identify public companies, and retrieve the filing type
and filing date for each requested file by linking the accession number back to the Master
Index files maintained by the SEC.8 We classify these filings into six groups: 10-K, 10-Q,
8-K, insider, registration, and proxy.9 Finally, we calculate the monthly IP search volume
for each filing category at firm level by counting the total number of unique IP address that
searched one category of SEC filings of a specific company within one month window. We
define IP total as the total number of unique IP addresses searching all six types of EDGAR
filings. Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015) documents that periodic accounting reports
are the type of SEC filings most frequently requested by investors through EDGAR website.
As a result, we also compute two additional measures of information acquisition targeting
specifically firms’ periodic accounting reports. IP funtl (IP 10K) is the total number of
unique IP address searching 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files (10-K files). Our sample runs from
January 2003 to December 2014.10
It is important to mention that there are other sources for investors to access financial
filings such as firm’s investor relations website and Yahoo! Finance. Data vendors such
7First, following Lee, Ma, and Wang (2015), we exclude the searching records to each unique user who
download more than 50 unique firms’ filings in one day. The user is identified by unique IP address. Secondly,
following Ryans (2017) and Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015), we remove log records that reference
an index (idx=1), as index pages only provide the links to filings rather than filing itself. Third, following
Ryans (2017), we keep the request records with successful document delivery (code=200). Next, we further
exclude the search records to users with filing requests more than 25 per minute or more than 500 per day,
or with more than 3 unique CIK searching per minute. Finally, we only keep one search record for a specific
filing (unique accession number) to each user in a given day. This step is to avoid the duplicated records
due to users’ multiple views for same document especially after the adoption of XBRL filing in 2009. For
user who view financial reporting of XBRL adopted firm in interactive data format, every click on a different
footnote will generate a new search record although it references the same document.
8Further details about the EDGAR index files can be found at https://www.sec.gov/
edgar/searchedgar/accessing-edgar-data.htm
9We define 10-K category as filing type in ”10-K”, ”10-K/A”, ”10-K405”, ”10-K405/A”, ”10-KSB”,
”10KSB”, ”10-KSB-A”, ”10KSB/A”, ”10-KT”, ”NT 10-K”, ”10-KSB40”; 10-Q category as filing type in ”10-
Q”, ”10-Q/A”, ”10QSB”, ”10-QSB”, ”10QSB-A”, ”NT 10-Q”, 8-K category as filing type in ”8-K”, ”8-K/A”;
Insider category as filing type in ”SC 13G”, ”SC-13D”, ”SC 13G/A”, ”SC 13D/A”, ”3”, ”4”, ”5”; registration
category as filing type in ”S-1”, ”S-1/A”, ”S-3”, ”S-3/A”, ”S-3ASR”, ”424B5”, ”424B4”, ”424B3”, ”424B2”,
”FWP”; proxy category as filing type in ”DEF 14A”, ”DEF 14C”, ”DEFA14A”, ”DEFM14A”, ”DEFR14A”,
”DEFM14C”.
10There are significant gaps in the data prior to March 2003 and between September 2005 and May 2006,
due to lost or corrupt log file. As a result, we exclude these months from our sample in our analysis.
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as Bloomberg and FactSet also provide investors access to these reports. As a result, our
analysis of the EDGAR server log cannot capture all the views/downloads that the entire
universe of investors are conducting on company filings. However, the EDGAR server still
possesses several advantages compared to other information sources. First, it is questionable
that investors primarily use the company website to retrieve SEC filings. As an example,
Monga and Chasan (2015) quote General Electric CFO Jeffrey Bornstein, who noted that
GE’s 2013 annual report was downloaded from their investor relations website just 800
times.11 For the same annual report, the EDGAR logs record 21,987 (4,325) downloads in
the year (two months) following its filing. Secondly, some firms, such as Google (Alphabet,
Inc) and ExxonMobil, forward investors directly to the EDGAR website to obtain their
SEC filings. For such cases where the investor relations department links the investors
to the EDGAR site, these views/downloads will be captured in the SEC server. Third,
other sources of the company information often condense income statement and balance
sheet information into pre-specified bins. As a result, some critical components of firms’
financial information may be misrepresented. Lastly, investors could better assess firm’s
future prospects by reading the qualitative information contained in 10-K filings, which is
not available in these data consolidators (Loughran and McDonald (2011)).
We obtain monthly stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
and annual accounting data from Compustat. Our sample of stocks starts with all common
stocks traded on NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ. We adjust the stock returns by delisting. If
a delisting return is missing and the delisting is performance-related, we set the delisting
return to be -30% (Shumway (1997)).
We use standard control variables in our empirical analysis. Size (LnME) is defined as the
natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of June in each year. Book-to-market
ratio (LnBM) equals to the most recent fiscal year-end report of book value divided by the
market capitalization at the end of calendar year t-1. Book value equals the value of common
stockholders’ equity, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credits, minus the book value of
preferred stock. Momentum (Mom) is defined as the cumulative holding-period return from
month t-12 and t-2. We follow the literature by skipping the most recent month’s return
11https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-109-894-word-annual-report-1433203762.
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when constructing the Momentum variable. The short term reversal measure (REV) is the
prior month’s return. Turnover12 is the monthly trading volume over shares outstanding,
averaged within past 12 months. Since the dealer nature of the NASDAQ market makes its
turnover difficult to compare with the turnover observed on NYSE and AMEX, we follow Gao
and Ritter (2010) by adjusting trading volume for NASDAQ stocks.12 Institutional ownership
(IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by
total shares outstanding. Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is the standard deviation of the
residuals from the regression of daily stock excess returns on Fama and French (1993) 3-factor
returns within a month (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006)). Institutional ownership
data of stocks are available from Thomson Reuters (formerly CDA/Spectrum) Institutional
Holdings database (13F). Coverage is the log one plus number of analyst following a firm
from I/B/E/S. We download the file size and number of words of 10-Ks for all publicly-traded
firms from WRDS SEC Analytics.
We also construct measures for trading activities by hedge funds. Using the list of hedge
funds provided by Jiang (2014), we retrieve their quarterly holdings from Thomson Reuters
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. We define net purchases of stock i by hedge







where Shrowni,q is the number of shares of firm i held by hedge funds in quarter q, and
Shrouti,q is firm i’s number of shares outstanding in quarter q. To provide a basis for
comparison, we construct a similar measure for mutual fund investors.
2.2 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional means and
standard deviations of the variables for the full sample. The average number of unique IPs
searching for all six types of EDGAR filings is 155 in a month. The cross-sectional standard
12Specifically, we divide NASDAQ volume by 2.0, 1.8, 1.6, and 1.0 for the periods before February 2001,
between February 2001 and December 2001, between January 2002 and December 2003, and after January
2004, respectively.
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deviation is 317, indicating large cross-sectional variation among firms. Consistent with
Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015), annual reports is the mostly frequently searched
SEC filings, with an average of 60 IPs requesting in a month. IPs searching for 10-Q and
8-K files are relatively less frequent. The average institional ownership in our sample is 55%,
reflecting the rapid growth of assets managed by institutional investors during our sample
period. The remaining summary statistics are well known and do not require additional
discussion.
Panel B reports the pairwise rank correlation among our variables. As we can see, the
three IP variables are highly correlated. This is expected as periodic accounting reports
consist of the largest fraction of EDGAR search requests. The number of IPs is also highly
correlated with firm size, analyst coverage and turnover, suggesting firms with high investor
visibility and attention have more EDGAR users. The number of IPs is negatively correlated
with stock idiosyncratic volatility. However, this is mainly due to the size effect: small firms
with high return volatility attract less EDGAR searching. As we will see later, once we
control for firm size, the number of IPs becomes positively correlated with idiosyncratic
volatility, potentially because the incentives of acquiring information is larger when firm
valuation is more uncertain (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)).
2.3 Cross-sectional Determinants of Number of IPs
Theories of endogenous information acquisition suggest that information acquistion ac-
tivity is a function of both the cost of acquiring information and the benefits of trading
on acquired information. To isolate investors’ expected payoffs of information acquisition,
we need a model of expected information acquisition activities. To this end, we develop
and implement a simple characteristics-based model of expected information acquisition and
identify the discrepancies between realized and expected level of information acquisition.
Calculating these discrepancies requires proxies for information acquisition and firm charac-
teristics useful in estimating the expected level of information acquisition activities.
Our proxy for information acquisition activity is the number of unique IP addresses
searching for EDGAR filings for each firm at given month. To mitigate data mining concerns,
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we use three measures capturing information acquisition activities for different types of
EDGAR filings. IP total is the total number of unique IPs searching for all types of EDGAR
filings, and IP funtl (IP 10K) is the total number of unique IPs searching 10-K, 10-Q and
8-K files (10-K files). Our choice of firm characteristics is guided by information acquistion
theories. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with higher visibility and investor attention
wil attract more information acquisition, as these firms are more accessible in investors’
mind. We also conjecture that the strength of firms’ information environment will affect
information acquisition, although the direction of effect is not clear. On the one hand, firms
with abundant public information will be less costly to analyze, so we expect information
acquistion will increase with the quality of firm’s information environment. On the other
hand, better information environment means the stock is less likely to be mispriced ex-ante,
so investors’ incentive to acquire private information will be reduced. Finally, we expect
investors to have stronger incentive to acquire information on firms with higher valution
uncertainty. Following prior literature, we use firm size to proxy for investor visibility, trading
volume to proxy for investor attention (Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001); Barber and
Odean (2007)), analyst coverage to proxy for information environment13 (Hong, Lim, and
Stein (2000)), and idiosyncratic volatility to proxy for valuation uncertainty (Zhang (2006)).
We calculate the abnormal number of IPs by fitting monthly cross-sectional regressions
of the raw number of IPs to isolate the components of number of IPs not attributable to
firms’ size, turnover, analyst coverage and idiosyncratic volatility. To mitigate the effect of
outliers, we use the log of one plus number of IPs when estimating firms’ abnormal number
of IPs. Specifically, we calculate abnormal number of IPs for firm i in month t by estimating
the following regression:
Log(1 + IPi,t) = β0 + β1LnMEi,t + β2Coveragei,t + β3Turnover12i,t + β4IV OLi,t + i,t (2)
where LnME is the log of market capitalization in month t, Coverage is the log of one plus
13Another motivation for including analyst coverage is that Lee and So (2017) shows analyst coverage
contains information about future stock return. By including analyst coverage as a regressor, any expected
return information embedded in number of IPs will be incremental to that contained in analyst coverage
proxies.
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analyst coverage, Turnover12 is the monthly turnover averaged over past 12 months, and
IVOL is the daily idiosyncratic volatility following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006).
We define abnormal number of IPs for each firm-month as the regression residuals from
equation (1). We use the notation AIP to refer to the abnormal number of IPs, where higher
values correspond to firms that have greater number of IPs searching their EDGAR filings
given their size, trading volume, analyst coverage and volatility.
Table 2 reports the time-series average coefficients from estimating equation (1). The
three panels correspond to three different measures of IPs as dependent variables. To see the
improvement of R2, We add the explanatory variables one by one from Column (1) to Column
(7). Consistent with our hypothesis, information acquistion activities increase with firm size
(t-stat=69.44), as larger firms are more visible to investors. Size alone explains 40% of cross-
sectional variation of number of IPs. Column (2) and (3) show that information acquisition
increases with the strength of firms’ information environment and investor attention, proxied
by analyst coverage and turnover, respectively. Column (4) further shows that number of
IPs increases with return volatility after controlling for firm size. This finding suggests that
investors’ demand for information is larger for firms with more uncertain value. Column
(4) also shows that these four firm characteristics used in equation (1) explains 55% of the
cross-sectional variation of number of IPs on average. The results are similar in Panel B and
C where the dependent variable are IP fundl and IP 10K, respectively.
The four firm characteristics used in equation (1) were selected based on theories and
parsimony but may omit other firm characteristics that drive variation in the expected
level of information acquisition activity. For example, investors may be attracted to firms
with extreme past performance and glamour characteristics (Barber and Odean (2007)).
To examine the explanatory power of other firm characteristics, we add stock’s past 12-
month return, book-to-market ratio and institutional ownership iteratively from Column
(5) to Column (7). The results suggest more investors searching for EDGAR filings when
the firm performs poorly in the past year and behave like value stocks. However, adding
these additional three characteristics improve the average R2 of equation (1) by only 0.5%,
suggesting the limited incremental explanatory power of past return performance, book-to-
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market and institutional ownership. In the robustness test below, we show that the inclusion
of other firm characteristics does not significantly affect the return predictability of AIP.
As there might be nonlinear relationship between abnormal number of IPs and firm char-
acteristics, we further look at average stock characteristics across decile portfolios sorted on
abnormal number of IPs searching for 10-K files (AIP 10K). Higher (lower) deciles corre-
spond to firms with abnormally high (low) number of IPs. Panel C of Table 1 reports the
time-series average of cross-sectional mean values of each variable for each decile. First, the
observation counts show that there are about 330 firms in each decile, suggesting that our
measure of information acquisition is available for a broad cross-sectional sample of 3300
firms per month. Second, the table shows that AIP is positively correlated with the raw
number of IPs searching for EDGAR filings. Third, AIP is, by construction, uncorrelated
with firm size, analyst coverage, turnover, and volatility, although middle portfolios have
slightly larger size and turnover. Last, the panel shows that firms in the extreme deciles
have lower institutional ownership and more likely to be value stocks.
3 Information Acquisition and Future Stock Returns
When investors expend effort and time to acquire firms’ fundamental information, they
must perceive some benefits of utilizing such information. Hence a key hypothesis in this
paper is that costly information acquistion activities reveal investors’ perception of expected
payoff. Although in theory, the direction of the information content could be either positive
or negative, in reality we expect firms with larger number of IPs searching their EDGAR
filings to have better future performance due to short-sale constraints. In addition, the
positive predictive power of AIP should be stronger among small firms with stonger short-
selling constraints. In this section, we test the relation between abnormal number of IPs and
future return using both portfolio sorts and Fama-MacBeth regression.
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3.1 Portfolio Sorts
In this section, we show that stocks sorted based on their abnormal number of IPs
generate significant return spreads. We conduct the decile portfolio sorts as follows. At the
end of each month, we sort stocks into deciles by their AIP. We then compute the average
return of each decile portfolio over the next month. This gives us a time series of monthly
returns for each decile. We use these time series to compute the average excess return of
each decile over the entire sample. As we are most interested in the return spread between
the two extreme portfolios, we also report the return to a long–short portfolio (i.e., a zero-
investment portfolio that goes long the stocks in the highest AIP decile and shorts the stocks
in the lowest decile). Our sample is from January 2003 to December 2014.
Table 3 reports the average monthly excess return of each decile portfolio. Panel A
reports the equal-weighted portfolio return, and Panel B reports the value-weighted return.
The three columns in each panel correspond to sorting based on the abnormal number of IPs
searching for three different types of EDGAR filings. Panel A shows a strong positive relation
between AIP and future returns, regardless of which IP variables we use. For sorts based on
AIP total, firms in the highest decile of AIP outperforms the firms in the lowest decile by 71
basis points per month on an equal-weighted basis (t-stat=3.18). The results are stronger
when we do the portfolio sorts based on AIP funtl and AIP 10K. Specifically, the high-
minus-low monthly return spread is 100 basis points (t-stat=4.70) based on AIP 10K, which
corresponds to an annualized return of 12%. The evidence show that aggregate information
acquisition activities across EDGAR users reveal an economically large source of predictable
return across firms. The economic magnitude is quite impressive given the fact that many
other well-documented asset pricing anomalies are no longer profitable in our sample period
(Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2014); Green, Hand, and Zhang (2017)).
The larger return spread based on IPs searching for 10K compared to IPs searching for
other types of EDGAR filings is consistent with information acquisition theories. Firms’
annual report is among the most lengthy and difficult-to-read SEC filings. Annual reports
contain detailed annual operating and financial performance and metrics, suggesting that
digesting these report require a large amount of effort and attention from investors’ part.
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Compared to 10-K files, 10-Q and 8-K files are usually shorter and easier to digest, and
investors driven to these type of filings more likely respond to contempraneous news events,
rather than reflecting delibrate information acquisition choice. Given the substantial higher
cost of acquiring and analyzing 10-K files, the expected benefits perceived by investors should
also be larger, which is consistent with our results.
The return spread of high-AIP minus low-AIP portfolio is considerably smaller and less
significant when returns are value weighted. The high-minus-low return is only around 30
basis points per monthly, and not significant. This is consistent with our prior that when
short-sale constraints are less binding for big firms, the information content embeded through
EDGAR searching could be either positive or negative. Investors could take unconstrained
short position to benefit from the negative information they obtained through EDGAR
filings. This implies that, ex-ante, we do not have a clear directional prediction between
abnormal number of IPs and future return. When we take a closer look at the value-weighted
portfolio return from decile 1 to decile 10, we find the relation between AIP and average
return is an inverted U shape. This could be due to the fact that firms in the top decile of
AIP are a mixture of firms with high and low expected return, and in aggregate they cancel
out.
Table 4 examines the relation between abnormal number of IPs and firms’ future return
after controlling for portfolios’ exposure to standard asset pricing factors. The table reports
the monthly Carhart (1997) four factor alpha for decile portfolios sorted on AIP, as well
as the long/short hedge portfolio. The four factor alpha is the intercept from a regression
of the portfolio’s excess return on the contemporaneous excess market return (MKTRF),
the size factor (SMB), the value factor (HML), and the momentum factor (UMD). Panel
A shows that AIP continously to predict strong positive return spread cross-sectionally for
equal-weighted portfolios. The four-factor alphas of the long/short portfolio range from 52
to 82 basis points per month and are highly significant. Morever, in the case of AIP 10K,
the alphas are fairly symmetric across deciles. The lowest AIP decile portfolio generates four
factor alpha of about -34 basis points (t-stat=-2.84), and the highest AIP decile generates
positive alpha of 48 basis points (t-stat=3.30). The evidence suggests that when short-
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sale constraints is binding, investors would rationally allocate less effort towards firms with
negative expected return. Panel B of Table 4 shows the portfolio alpha for value-weighted
returns. Again, we find the results are generally weaker, both economically and statistically.
The four-factor alpha of long/short portfolio ranges from 14 to 42 basis points, and are either
insignificant or only marginally significant.
To emphasize the importance of measuring the abnormal level of information acquisition
activity when uncovering expected return information, we conduct a parallel portfolio tests
when ranking firms into deciles based on the raw number of IPs searching for EDGAR filings
in Table 5. Panel A reports the equal-weighted excess return and Panel B reports the equal-
weighted four-factor alpha. The results show that the raw number of IPs is not significantly
correlated with firms’ future returns, regardless of which IP variable we use. The monthly
four-factor alpha of the long-short portfolio based on raw number of IP ranges from -20 to
9 basis points, and are never significant. The lack of significant predictive power of raw
IP suggests that it is important to control for the expected level of information acquistion
activities when uncovering investors’ expected payoff.
To get a better sense of how the AIP strategy performs if an investor could get access
to the EDGAR log file data at monthly frequency, we plot the cumulative returns to the
low and high AIP 10K decile portfolio, as well as the long-short hedge portfolio in Figure 1.
The blue line shows that one dollar invested in the lowest AIP 10K decile portfolio at the
beginning of 2003 will grow to two at the end of 2014. One dollar invested in the highest
AIP 10K decile portfolio will grow to 7.5. The grey line shows that one dollar will grow to
almost four dollar if investing in the long-short hedged portfolio, with a smooth return path.
3.2 Robustness
In Table A1, we examine the robustness of our portfolio sorts. For brevity, we focus
on the sorts based on AIP 10K. The first row shows the return spread when returns are
weighted by past month gross return, as suggested by Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and
Kalcheva (2013). The gross-return-weighted return spread is 1.1% (t=5.16). Row (2) and (3)
show that our results barely change when we substract the characteristic-matched portfolio
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(Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997)) or industry-level return from stock return.
This suggests the nature of information contained in costly information acquistion behavior
is firm-specific. In the fourth row, we augment the Carhart (1997) four-factors with the
Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) five-
factor adjusted alpha is 0.80% (t=4.23) for the equal-weighted portfolio and 0.35% (t=1.78)
for the value-weighted portfolio. The fifth row shows that our results hold when we use the
Fama and French (2016) five factors to calculate alphas, with a monthly return spread of
0.69% (t=3.36) for the equal-weighted portfolio. This suggests our long-short portfolio is not
merely loading on the profitability and investment factor as proposed by Fama and French
(2016). The sixth row shows that our results still hold when we use the Stambaugh and Yuan
(2016) mispricing factor model to compute alpha. The portfolio generates equal-weighted
alpha of 0.89%(t=4.42) and value-weighted alpha of 0.27%(t=1.35). Using Hou, Xue, and
Zhang (2015) Q-factor model also do not change our results, as shown in the seventh row.
The eighth row of Table A1 shows that our results survive when we exclude stocks whose
market capitalization are in the bottom quintile of NYSE size distribution. Again, the
strategy based on AIP generates a monthly four-factor alpha of 0.52% (t=2.58) and 0.28%
(t=1.35) when returns are equal-weighted and value-weighted, respectively. The ninth row
reports the long-short alphas if we skip six months between when we sort stocks and when
we measure strategy returns. The purpose of this test is to mimick the profits an investor
would generate in reality since SEC delay the release of EDGAR log file data by 6 months.
The equal-weighted alpha reduces quite a bit in this case, but nontheless still significant with
an equal-weighted four-factor alpha of 0.53% (t=2.23). The tenth and eleventh rows show
that the long-short portfolio generates significant alpha in two subperiods: one from 2003 to
2008 and another from 2009 to 2014.
Our results are insensitive to the specific model of calculating abnormal number of IPs,
as we show in Table A2. The first row shows that the long-short portfolio based on AIP 10K
calculated using model (7) of equation 2 generates four-factor alpha of 0.66% (t=3.95). In the
second row, we show that positive relation between AIP and returns holds for change-based
specifications, which mitigates concerns that the return predictability of AIP is driven by an
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omitted firm-fixed effect not controlled for in our model of AIP or multivariate regresssions.
The long-short portfolio based on change of AIP 10K relative to its 12-month moving aveage
generates equal-weighted four-factor alpha of 0.88% (t=4.82). In the third row, we include
the square terms of the four firm characteristics when calculating AIP to account for the
nonlinear relation between number of IPs and firm characteristics. The 4-factor alpha is
0.689% and 0.552% for equal- and value-weighted portfolio, respectively. In the fourth
row, we control for the lagged number of IPs when calculating AIP, and the alpha is still
significant.
3.3 The Role of Firm Size and Arbitrage Frictions
Our previous results show that the long/short portfolio alpha is only significant for equal-
weighted return, but not value-weighted return. This raises the concern that the return
predictability of AIP strategy only exists among small capitalization stocks. To take a closer
look at the role of firm size, we reports the results by size quintiles in Table 6. For each
month, we group all stocks into size quintiles based on the NYSE size breakpoints. Within
each size quintile, we further sort stocks into quintiles based on AIP 10K. The table reports
the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha for the 25 portfolios: equal-weighted returns in Panel
A and value-weighted returns in Panel B. We also report the alpha for each size quintile of
the high-AIP minus low-AIP portfolios. The result shows that the return predictability of
AIP is strongest among microcap stocks, but interestingly, the result also shows that it is
not limited to only the smallest size quintile. The high-minus-low AIP portfolio generates
an equal-weighted four-factor alpha of 0.45% (t=2.29) and value-weighted alpha of 0.31%
(t=1.89) in the largest size quintile. The alpha is also significant in the middle size quintile
group, but are insignificant in size quintile 2 and 4.
The findings in Table 6 show that the return predictability of AIP is more pronounced
for small firms than for large firms, which could be driven by two non-mutually exclusive
channels. The first reason is that the latent information embedded in the number of IPs
searching EDGAR files could be either positive or negative when short-sale constraints are
not binding. Given large firms have less short-sale impediments, the direction of return
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predictability among large firms is more ambiguous. An indpendent channel that could
reinforce the weak return predictability among these stocks is that whatever information
contained in the EDGAR searches, they are arbitraged away quickly due to less arbitrage
frictions (e.g., short-sale costs, liquidity, non-fundamental volatility) among large firms. We
now explore the return predictability of AIP with other measures of limits to arbitrage.
Following the literature, we investigate the role of three limits-to-arbitrage measures:
idiosyncratic volatility (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015); Pontiff (2006)), residual institu-
tional ownership (Nagel (2005)) and residual analyst coverage (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)).
At the end of each month, we sort all stocks into terciles based on each limits-to-arbitrage
variable X. We then independently sort stocks into quintiles based on the abnormal number
of IPs searching for 10K files. In Table 7, we report the equal-weighted four-factor alpha
of the lowest and highest AIP portfolio among the lowest and highest X group. Consis-
tent with the limits to arbitrage predictions, the alpha of high-minus-low AIP 10K portfolio
is more pronounced among stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, lower institutional
ownership and less analyst coverage. For example, the high-minus-low AIP 10K portfolio
generates 1.24% (t=4.44) monthly alpha among high volatility stocks, while only 0.23%
(t=1.76) among low volatility stocks.
3.4 Variation in Complexity of Financial Filings
Our maintained hypothesis is that investors’ costly information acquisition activity should
be positively related to the expected payoff from using the information. If this is true, we
would expect the payoff to be larger when information acquisition/processing cost is higher.
To test this prediction, we use the complexity of firm’s financial filings to proxy for cost of
information acquisition/processing. The idea is intuitive, as more complex filings require
more effort and time for investors to process and digest. Following the most recent literature
(Loughran and McDonald (2014)), we use the size of firm’s 10-K filing and the number of
words contained in the filing to proxy for filing complexity.14
14Loughran and McDonald (2014) document that 10-K file size is positively associated with high return
volatility in a one-month period following 10-K filings, supporting the use of file size as proxy for the linguistic
complexity of 10-K disclosure.
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To this end, we first get the filing size and number of words contained in firms’ most
recent 10-K report. As big firms have more business lines and diverse set of operations, they
naturally have lengthy and larger 10-K filing.15 To remove the confounding effect of firm size,
we regress the log of filing size and number of words on the log of firm’s market captalization,
and use the regression residual as our proxy of filing complexity. At the end of each month,
we sort all stocks into terciles based on either the residual file size or the residual word count.
We then independently sort stocks into quintiles based on AIP 10K. In Table 8, we report
the equal-weighted four-factor alpha of the lowest and highest AIP 10K portfolio among
the highest and lowest group of filing complexity. Consistent with theories of endogenous
information acquisition, the alpha of high-minus-low portfolio is indeed larger and more
significant among firms with more complex financial filing. For example, the high-minus-low
AIP 10K portfolio generates 0.92% (t=4.46) monthly alpha among firms with largest 10-K
size, and 0.65% (t=3.51) among firms with small 10-K size. The result is similar when we use
the word count in 10-K as proxy for disclosure complexity. Overall, the evidence provides
strong support to our hypothesis that the more costly information acquistion/processing is,
the larger the expected payoff revealed by information acquisition activity.
3.5 Fama-MacBeth Regression
We now test our main hypothesis using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression method-
ology. One advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to examine the predictive power
of AIP while controlling for other known predictors of cross-sectional stock returns. This is
important because, as shown in Table 1, AIP is correlated with some of these predictors. We
conduct the Fama-MacBeth regressions in the usual way. Each month, starting in February
2003 and ending in December 2014, we run the following cross-sectional regression:
Reti,t+1 = β0 + β1AIPi,t + γXi,t + i,t (3)
15The rank correlation is 0.34 between 10-K file size and firm size, and 0.40 between word count and firm
size.
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where Reti,t+1 is return of stock i in month t + 1, AIPi,t is the abnormal number of IPs
searching for firm i’s EDGAR filings in month t, and X is a set of control variables known
to predict returns, including the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (LnBM), the
natural logarithm of the market value of equity (LnME), returns from the prior month (Rev),
returns from the prior 12-month period excluding month t-1 (Mom), institutional ownership
(IO), and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and past 12-month turnover (Turnover12).
Table 9 reports the time-series averages of the coefficients on the independent variables,
and the t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted with four lags to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. We report the results for AIP total from Column (1) to (3), AIP fundl
from Column (4) to (6) and AIP 10K from Column (7) to (9). Column (1), (4) and (7) shows
the coefficient on AIP without any other return predictors. The coefficients on all three
AIP variables are positive and significant at 1% level. This is consistent with our portfolio
sorting results in which stocks with abnormal large number of IPs searching its EDGAR
filings have higher expected return. In Column (2), (5) and (8), we add the usual controls
including size, book-to-market ratio, past 1-month returns, and past 12-month returns. The
coefficients on AIP barely change and retains its strong predictive power. In Column (3), (6)
and (9), we further add institutional ownership, turnover and idiosyncratic volatility in the
regression, and AIP still positively predicts future returns. The economic magnitude is also
quite large. The difference of AIP 10K between the lowest decile portfolio and highest decile
portfolio is 2.39, which implies a monthly return spread of 105 basis points between these
two extreme deciles. The magnitude estimated from Fama-MacBeth regression is in line with
our portfolio sorting results. For the control variables, the sign of coefficients is consistent
with previous literature, except for momentum, which attracts a negative coefficient.16 Due
to the short and recent sample period, however, the coefficients on most control variables
are not significantly different from zero.
EDGAR searching activity is positively related to scheduled firm events such as earnings
annoucement (Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015)). Since earnings surprise leads to
post-earnings announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas (1989)) and announcement months
16This is due to the 2009 momentum crash, see Daniel and Moskowitz (2016). The coefficient on Momen-
tum becomes positive once we exclude year 2009 from our sample.
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are generally associated with postive stock return (Lamont and Frazzini (2007)), the return
predictability of AIP may be driven by these earnings-related return predictability effects.
As a robustness check, we add standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and an earnings
announcement month dummy (EAM) in Fama-MacBeth regression. Column (1)-(3) of Table
A3 shows that the coefficients on AIP become stronger after controlling for earnings-related
variables, suggesting that the information contained in AIP is not driven by earnings-related
return predictability effects.
Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) show that reduction of breadth of institutional ownership
is a proxy for overvaluation when short-sale constraint is binding for some investors. To the
extent that breadth of ownership is positively correlated with the number of IPs searching
EDGAR filings, our result may be rediscovery of their finding. Column (4)-(6) of Table A3
shows this is not the case. The coefficients on AIP barely change after controlling for change
of breadth of ownership (dBreadth). The coefficient on change of breadth of ownership is
positive but insignificant, probably due to the short sample period.
Having established that abnormal number of IPs predicts one-month-ahead returns, our
next analysis examine the persistence of this preditive relation. This test could help rule out
an alternative explanation, that the short-run predictability is due to temporary price pres-
sure driven by investors’ demand for attention-grabbing stocks. For example, Da, Engelberg,
and Gao (2011) show that an increase in Google Search Volume for a stock predicts higher
stock prices in the short-run that eventually reverse back within a year. As we hypothesize
that AIP contains expected return information driven by firms’ fundamental changes, the
return predictability of AIP should not reverse over the long-run. To test this, we run Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression of cumulative returns from month t + j to t + k on the
abnormal number of IPs searching 10-K filings in EDGAR database (AIP 10K) at month t.
The result is report in Table 10. We separately show the return predictability of AIP 10K
for the next quarter return skipping the immediate month in Column (1), the second quarter
return in Column (2), the second half-year return in Column (3) and the second year return
in Column (4). The table shows that lagged value of AIP also significantly predicts returns
for up to 2 quarters, and eventually levels off for longer horizon. The coefficient on AIP
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is always positive and never reverse, mitigating concerns that the predictive power of AIP
comes from transitory price pressure that reverses subsequently. Investors searching firm
fundamentals through EDGAR system appear to be more sophisticated than those search-
ing through Google Search Engine, and their aggregate information acquisition activities
contains value-relevant information about firms that slowly diffuse into stock prices.
3.6 Which Types of EDGAR Filings Matter Most?
Given the high correlation between the three types of IP measures as shown in Table
1, we next examine whether the expected return information embedded in the three AIP
variables are incremental to each other. To test this, we run a horse race by including
all three AIP variables in the Fama-MacBeth regression. The result is reported in Table
11. Column (1) reports the result without other controls, and Column (2) includes all
the usual return predictors. The results show clearly that the return predictability of AIP
comes mainly from those searching for firms’ annual report 10K. While AIP 10K retains its
strong predictive power, the coefficient on AIP total and AIP fundl becomes insignificant.
Acquiring and analyzing 10K report is more costly than other SEC filings and more reflect
delibrate information acquisition behavior. The result is thus consistent with our hypothesis
that costly information acquisition activity contains expected benefits from utilizing such
information.
3.7 IPs or Searches?
Our measure of information acquisition activity essentially equal weights each investor
searching through EDGAR regardless of the number of searches they requested through
EDGAR system during one month window. An alternative measure of information acqui-
sition activity is the total number of searches on a firm requested by investors through
EDGAR system. This measure is probematic because, as documented by Drake, Roul-
stone, and Thornock (2015), the number of requests through EDGAR is dominated by a
small fraction of investors who access EDGAR very frequently, and their activities are over-
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represented in this alternative measure.17 Under the assumption that information is more
likely dispersed among a large group of market participants (Hayek (1945)), we think that
our measure of abnormal number of IPs should be more powerful in terms of backing out
the latent information embedded in ”the wisdom of crowd”. Nevertheless, to test which
measure of information acquistion activity has stronger return predictability, we conduct a
horse race between the abnormal number of searches (Asearch) and abnormal number of IPs
(AIP) using Fama-MacBeth regreesion approach. Using the same decomposition method,
we extract the abnormal number of searches for each firm as the residual from a monthly
regression of log one plus raw number of EDGAR requests for SEC filings on the same set
of firm characteristics used in equation (1).
The result is reported in Table 12. We look at searches/IPs for all types of EDGAR files in
Column (1) and (2), 10K, 10Q and 8K in Column (3) and (4), and searches for annual reports
only in Column (5) and (6). Column (1), (3) and (5) show that the return predictability
of Asearch is generally positive but weaker compared to that of AIP. Column (2), (4) and
(6) show that once we control for AIP, the coefficient on Asearch is no longer significant
and even changes sign. Importantly, the coefficients on AIP are still positive and highly
significant. The result supports our use of number of IPs as a cleaner measure of aggregate
information acquisition activity, and indirectly supports the underlying assumption that
private information is dispersed among market participants.
4 Channels
The key hypothesis in this paper is that information acquisition activity embeds expected
return information because investors rationally expend greater effort to analyzing firms that
are underpriced with large price appreciation potential. As mispricing implies the separation
of stock prices from firms’ fundamental value, there are two non-mutually exclusive channels
through which investors can identify mispricing. The first channel is that investors’ costly in-
formation acquistion contains their favorable expectation of firms’ fundamental performance
17Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015) document that 86% of the users accessing EDGAR do so infre-
quently and only around 2% of the users access EDGAR actively during a given quarter.
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that are not fully priced in by market. A second channel is that investors identify mispricing
by observing changes in stock prices that are unwarranted by firms’ fundamental changes.
In this section, we test both channels.
4.1 Predicting Fundamental Performance
We first test whether information acquistion via EDGAR reveals novel information about
firms’ fundamental performance change. We use two measures of firms’ fundamental perfor-
mance. The first one is the change of quarterly Return-on-Asset (dROA) from four quarters
ago, which takes into account of the seasonality of firms’ operating performance. The second
measure is the monthly forecast revision of analysts’ consensus Earnings-per-Share (EPS)
forecast (FREV) scaled by stock prices 12 months ago, as a higher frequency measure of
firms’ fundamental performance. We run panel regression of dROA and FREV on lagged
AIP, controlling for other firm characteristics that are correlated with firms’ fundamental per-
formance, including size, book-to-market, past 12-month return, analyst coverage, turnover,
institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility and lagged quarterly ROA. Since quar-
terly Return-on-Assets is measured at quarterly frequency, we calculate the AIP at quarterly
frequency as the monthly AIP averaged within a quarter. We also control for time fixed effect
and standard errors are double clustered by firm and time following Petersen (2009). If the
return predictability of AIP is partially driven by its predictive power for firm fundamentals,
the coefficient on AIP should be significantly positive.
Table 13 reports the results of predicting fundamental performance based on AIP. The
dependent variable is the change of quarterly ROA from Column (1) to Column (3), and
analyst forecast revision from Column (4) to Column (6). We show the predictability result
for all three AIP measures. The coefficients on AIP are significantly positive for both mea-
sures of fundamental performance, regardless of which AIP measures we use. The economic
magnitude is non-trivial. For example, Column (3) shows that an interquartile increase in
AIP 10K is associated with an increase of 0.22 percentage points in dROA, which is about
17% of the interquartile range of quarterly change of ROA. This finding suggests that infor-
mation acquisition via EDGAR contains investors’ expectation about firms’ future operating
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performance and even leads analysts’ revision of their forecast of firms’ fundamental. It is
worth pointing out that the predictability of AIP is obtained after controlling for other de-
terminants of firms’ fundamental performance. For example, past 12-month return strongly
positively predict change of ROA and analyst forecast revision, while turnover and idiosyn-
cratic volatility negatively predict fundamental performance. Overall, the test supports our
hypothesis that the source of return predictability comes from investors allocating greater
effort towards firms with improving fundamentals.
4.2 Underpricing Driven by Outflow-induced Fire Sale
A second channel through which mispricing could occur is exogeneous shock to stock
prices that are unwarranted by fundamentals. One such example is index addition event, as
Shleifer (1986), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), and Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2014)
show that forced buying from index-tracking institutional investors around such events could
lead to large price pressure on affected stocks. However, index addition events are rare, which
limits its applicability in our setting. In this paper, we use mutual fund outflow-induced fire
sell as an exogeneous shock to stock price. Coval and Stafford (2007), Khan, Kogan, and
Serafeim (2012) and Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) find that mutual funds sell firm’s
shares roughly in proportion to its portfolio weights when facing severe outflows. The forced
selling behavior results in significant downward price pressure that persists for more than
a year. This is a relatively exogenous and clean meausre of underpricing as it is associated
with who is selling–funds facing large investor redemptions–rather than what is being sold,
so it is unlikely driven by (unobserved) changes in firms’ fundamental performance.
To test whether investors expend more effort and time towards firms experiencing fire sell-
induced underpricing, we examine change of abnormal number of IPs following flow-induced
fire sale. Specifically, we run the following Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression:
dAIPi,q+1 = β0 + β1Outflowsi,q + β2Xi,q + i,q+1 (4)
where Outflowi,q is the flow-induced fire sale measure calculated following Edmans, Gold-
stein, and Jiang (2012), which reflects fund outflow expressed as a percentage of firms’ shares
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outstanding. Our dependent variable dAIPi,q+1 is the within-firm change of AIP in quarter
q+1 following mutual fund outflows. X is a set of firm characteristics that may affect change
of AIP.
Table 14 reports the result. Again we show the result for all three AIP measures. Column
(1), (3) and (5) show the coefficients on ”Outflows” are significantly negative without other
controls, for all three IP measures. The negative coefficient means that more investors are
searching for the EDGAR filing of firms that are underpriced due to exogenous reasons.
Column (2), (4) and (6) show that the negative relation between outflows-induced selling
pressure and change in AIP is robust after controlling for firms’ size, book-to-market ratio,
analyst coverage, idiosyncratic volatility, turnover, institutional ownership and past returns,
suggesting our findings are likely driven by variation in underpricing.
In sum, by using mutual fund outflow-induced selling pressure to identify stock-level un-
derpricing, our test also supports the second channel that part of the return predictability we
document is attributable to investors allocating more attention and resources towards firms
experiencing exogenous sources of undervaluation that deviates from firm fundamentals.
4.3 Information Acquisition and Institutional Trading
As investors’ information acquisition through EDGAR contain value-relevant information
about stocks, a natural question that emerges is who are these sophisticated investors?
Although we don’t have the identify of those searching through EDGAR system, hedge fund
managers appear to fit the profile of informed investors in the equity market. A growing
literature shows that hedge funds possess stock picking skills and are able to identify stock-
level mispricing (Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004); Jiao, Massa, and Zhang (2016); Agarwal,
Jiang, Tang, and Yang (2013)). If hedge fund managers rationally allocate more resouces and
efforts towards firms with improving fundamentals, they should also trade in the direction
of the latent information indicated by EDGAR search traffic.
To examine whether abnormal number of IPs predict hedge fund trades, we run Fama-
MacBeth regression of net purchases by hedge funds and mutual funds in quarter q on lagged
AIP, and control for other stock characteristics that might influence fund trading decisions.
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Net purchase is measured as quarterly change of hedge fund holding on a stock, where
holding is expressed as a fraction of firm’s shares outstanding. Since hedge fund trades are
inferred from quarterly holding reports, we calculate the AIP at quarterly frequency as the
monthly AIP averaged within a quarter. Specifically, in each quarter, we run the following
cross-sectional regression:
NetBuyi,q = β0 + β1AIPi.q−1 + β2Holdi,q−1 + γXi,q−1 + i,q (5)
where NetBuyi,q is either the net purchases by hedge funds or those by mutual funds in
quarter q, AIPi,q−1 is abnormal number of IPs searching for firm i’s EDGAR filings in
quarter q− 1, Holdi,q−1 is either the hedge fund ownership or mutual fund ownership at end
of quarter q−1, and Xi,q−1 is a vector of firm chacacteristics at end of quarter q−1, including
firm size, book-to-market, analyst coverage, volatility, turnover, institutional ownership and
momentum. If hedge funds contribute to informed searches through EDGAR, the coefficient
on AIP should be significant and positive.
Table 15 reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional regression coefficients.
The dependent variable from Column (1) to Column (3) is net buying by hedge funds. The
coefficient on AIP in the regression of hedge funds’ net purchases is positive and significant
for all three measures of AIP. In terms of economic magnitude, one interquartile increase
in AIP 10K is associated with an increase of 0.26 percentage points in hedge funds’ net
purchases, which is about 25% of the interquartile range of net buying by hedge funds. The
economic magnitude is reasonable given that not all hedge funds are fundamental investors
and they also have other information sources to aid their investment decisions. In contrast,
Column (4) to (6) show that abnormal number of IPs searching EDGAR filing does not
significantly predict mutual funds’ net purchase.
Overall, the evidence suggests that either hedge funds are part of these sophisticated
investors making informed searches through EDGAR system, or their own information source
is consistent with the latent information embedded in ”the wisdom of crowds”. Either
intepretation would provide support to our premise in this paper that investors’ information
acquisition activity reveals their expected benefits of trading on such information.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the expected return information contained in investors’ costly
information acquisition activities. Specifically, we use a novel dataset of investors’ requests to
company filings through EDGAR system to back out their expectations over future payoffs.
To this end, we develop and implement a simple characteristic-based model to decompose
the total number of IPs searching for EDGAR filings into an abnormal and expected com-
ponents and show that the abnormal number of IPs searching for firms’ financial reports
positively predict subsequent stock returns. A long-short portfolio that buys stocks with
abnormal number of IPs in the top decile and sells stocks in the bottom decile generates an
equal-weighted monthly four-factor alpha of up to 82 basis points that does not reverse in the
long run. We also find that abnormal number of IPs predicts firms’ assending fundamen-
tal performance and also increases following exogenous underpricing, suggesting investors
rationally allocate greater resources and effort towards firms with large price appreciation
potential. Lastly, information acquistion via EDGAR also predicts subsequent purhcases by
hedge fund managers, suggesting that sophisticated investors are making informed searches
on firms with largest potential payoffs.
Taken together, our findings provide empirical support to theoretical models of endoge-
nous information acquistion that costly information acquisition activity is positively associ-
ated with the value of information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). Our research also high-
lights the promise of using the collective wisdom of investors–extracted from their EDGAR
search behavior–to study expected returns and other important economic outcomes.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Returns to AIP strategy
This figure shows the cumulative equal-weighted returns to the lowest and highest decile portfolios sorted
on abnormal number of IPs searching for 10-K files in EDGAR system (AIP 10K). Grey line represents the
cumulative returns to the top-minus-bottom portfolio formed on AIP 10K. The sample runs from January
2003 to December 2014.
36
Table 1: Stock-Level Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. Panel A reports the summary statistics for
the full sample. Panel B reports the pairwise rank correlation among our variables where they overlap.
Panel C reports the characteristics of portfolios sorted on abnormal number of IPs searching for 10-K files
in SEC’s EDGAR database (AIP 10K). IP total is the total number of unique IP address searching all six
types of EDGAR filings. IP funtl is the total number of unique IP address searching 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K
files. AIP 10K is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses
searching for 10K files in EDGAR database. Each month, we sort all stocks into deciles based on their
AIP 10K. We first calculate the mean of each variable for each decile each month and then calculate the
time-series average of cross-sectional means. LnME is the natural log of firm’s market capitalization at the
end of the June of each year in millions of US dollars. Coverage is log one plus analyst coverage. Turnover12
is the monthly turnover ratio averaged over the past 12 months. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility,
calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of
the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined
as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by
institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. The overall sample
period is from January 2003 to December 2014.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Median STD P25 P75
Number of IPs searching for EDGAR filings
IP total 155 94 317 56 159
IP funtl 107 64 213 37 111
IP 10K 60 32 135 17 60
IP 10Q 37 24 61 13 42
IP 8K 33 19 79 10 36
Firm-level characteristics
LnME 6.16 6.08 1.98 4.74 7.47
LnBM -0.66 -0.56 0.84 -1.11 -0.12
Mom 16.67% 7.64% 57.57% -12.06% 31.78%
Coverage 1.49 1.59 1.01 0.59 2.30
IVOL 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03
Turnover12 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.05 0.21
IO 55.30% 59.15% 31.41% 28.92% 80.58%
Firm fundamentals and institutional trades
dROA (%) 0.032 -0.018 4.844 -0.684 0.599
FREV (%) -0.106 -0.001 22.185 -0.070 0.052
Net buying by HFs (%) 0.102 -0.002 2.106 -0.475 0.582
Net buying by MFs (%) 0.266 0.093 2.649 -0.640 1.204
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Table 1 Continued
Panel B: Rank Correlations
IP total IP funtl IP 10K LnME Cov Turnover12 Ivol LnBM Mom IO
IP total 1.000
IP funtl 0.918 1.000
IP 10K 0.812 0.897 1.000
LnME 0.671 0.664 0.672 1.000
Cov 0.594 0.605 0.603 0.832 1.000
Turnover12 0.588 0.579 0.539 0.544 0.621 1.000
Ivol -0.134 -0.149 -0.212 -0.523 -0.360 -0.016 1.000
LnBM -0.239 -0.229 -0.224 -0.319 -0.326 -0.303 0.051 1.000
Mom 0.031 0.023 0.044 0.112 0.051 0.049 -0.117 0.008 1.000
IO 0.469 0.494 0.514 0.650 0.647 0.615 -0.306 -0.193 0.095 1.000
Table 1 Continued
Panel C: Descriptive statistics by AIP 10K deciles
Obs AIP 10K IP total IP funtl IP 10K LnME Cov Turnover12 Ivol LnBM Mom IO
1(Low) 330 -1.25 59 35 12 5.977 1.369 0.154 0.025 -0.590 0.150 45.53%
2 330 -0.60 76 51 22 6.074 1.513 0.163 0.024 -0.719 0.164 53.38%
3 330 -0.38 91 63 30 6.166 1.573 0.166 0.024 -0.742 0.163 57.21%
4 330 -0.21 104 72 36 6.248 1.611 0.170 0.024 -0.741 0.172 59.23%
5 330 -0.07 116 82 42 6.270 1.623 0.171 0.024 -0.711 0.176 60.20%
6 330 0.07 128 91 48 6.284 1.634 0.170 0.024 -0.700 0.173 60.79%
7 330 0.22 141 101 55 6.218 1.594 0.165 0.024 -0.662 0.174 60.19%
8 330 0.39 160 116 66 6.118 1.526 0.164 0.024 -0.623 0.164 58.91%
9 330 0.62 201 147 87 6.032 1.454 0.158 0.025 -0.563 0.162 56.09%
10(High) 330 1.14 464 342 226 6.257 1.483 0.163 0.025 -0.537 0.168 53.28%
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Number of IPs Searching EDGAR Fil-
ings
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression of log number of IPs searching SEC Edgar files. In
Panel A, the dependent variable is the log one plus number of unique IP addresses searching EDGAR
filings in a month. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the log one plus number of unique IP addresses
searching EDGAR 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files in a month. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the log one
plus number of unique IP addresses searching 10-K files in a month. LnME is the natural log of firm’s
market capitalization at the end of the June of each year in millions of US dollars. Coverage is log one
plus analyst coverage. Turnover12 is the average monthly turnover ratio over the past 12 months. IVOL is
the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Book-to-market
(LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted.
Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. Institutional ownership
(IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares
outstanding. The overall sample period is from January 2003 to December 2014.
Panel A: Dependent Variable is log(1+# of unique IP adresses searching all EDGAR filings)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LnME 0.2713*** 0.2356*** 0.2475*** 0.2943*** 0.2992*** 0.3015*** 0.3026***
(69.44) (71.54) (73.46) (75.60) (76.94) (77.29) (77.58)
Coverage 0.1310*** 0.0422*** 0.0382*** 0.0321*** 0.0332*** 0.0360***
(32.65) (14.39) (14.36) (12.17) (12.56) (14.17)
Turnover12 1.0083*** 0.7934*** 0.7862*** 0.7912*** 0.7877***
(30.21) (29.08) (30.04) (29.75) (30.52)
Ivol 9.1266*** 9.0159*** 9.0510*** 9.0215***
(34.65) (33.38) (33.16) (32.36)






Constant 2.5352*** 2.6342*** 2.5357*** 2.0730*** 2.0483*** 2.0408*** 2.0449***
(39.20) (40.68) (40.19) (33.45) (33.37) (33.32) (32.62)
Ave.R-sq 0.404 0.483 0.520 0.554 0.558 0.559 0.563
N.of Obs. 610651 488129 488129 488123 488123 488123 484835
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Table 2 Continued
Panel B: Dependent Variable is log(1+# of unique IP adresses searching 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LnME 0.2723*** 0.2355*** 0.2468*** 0.2931*** 0.2984*** 0.3015*** 0.3005***
(64.05) (61.21) (60.97) (65.17) (66.87) (67.27) (67.10)
Coverage 0.1405*** 0.0530*** 0.0492*** 0.0421*** 0.0436*** 0.0369***
(35.59) (15.60) (15.87) (13.86) (14.48) (15.57)
Turnover12 0.9833*** 0.7702*** 0.7708*** 0.7787*** 0.7560***
(29.18) (26.62) (27.23) (26.95) (27.32)
Ivol 9.0866*** 8.9652*** 9.0334*** 9.0934***
(36.40) (34.66) (34.19) (33.54)






Constant 2.2017*** 2.2804*** 2.1866*** 1.7281*** 1.7033*** 1.6943*** 1.6868***
(34.86) (36.21) (35.81) (28.85) (28.72) (28.66) (27.97)
Ave.R-sq 0.386 0.458 0.491 0.522 0.526 0.527 0.533
N.of Obs. 610651 488129 488129 488123 488123 488123 484835
Table 2 Continued
Panel C: Dependent Variable is log(1+# of unique IP adresses searching 10-K files)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
LnME 0.2979*** 0.2674*** 0.2765*** 0.3120*** 0.3169*** 0.3201*** 0.3155***
(61.33) (60.72) (59.37) (61.48) (62.64) (63.24) (62.55)
Coverage 0.1453*** 0.0729*** 0.0698*** 0.0637*** 0.0649*** 0.0431***
(35.85) (23.41) (23.28) (21.42) (21.49) (16.48)
Turnover12 0.8122*** 0.6461*** 0.6415*** 0.6522*** 0.5924***
(30.68) (28.59) (28.59) (28.74) (28.38)
Ivol 6.9981*** 6.9145*** 7.0130*** 7.2542***
(30.56) (29.46) (28.94) (29.41)






Constant 1.3873*** 1.4159*** 1.3396*** 0.9886*** 0.9639*** 0.9554*** 0.9267***
(25.17) (25.47) (24.67) (18.65) (18.51) (18.43) (17.62)
Ave.R-sq 0.388 0.467 0.486 0.501 0.504 0.506 0.511
N.of Obs. 610651 488129 488129 488123 488123 488123 484835
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Table 3: Portfolio Excess Returns Sorted on Abnormal Number of IPs
This table reports the monthly average excess returns for each of the decile portfolios, as well as the
long-short portfolio (High-Low). AIP total is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus
total number of unique IP addresses searching for all type of filings in EDGAR database on a set of firm
characteristics. Similarly, AIP funtl (AIP 10K) is constructed using number of IPs searching for 10-K, 10-Q
and 8-K files (10-K) in EDGAR database. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles based
on their abnormal number of IPs and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying the highest decile and
shorting the lowest decile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next month. Panel A reports
results for equally weighted portfolios and Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios. The sample
runs from January 2003 to December 2014.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Decile Portfolio Excess Return
AIP total t-stat AIP funtl t-stat AIP 10K t-stat
Low 0.46 1.20 0.50 1.29 0.47 1.22
2 0.78 1.78 0.76 1.73 0.63 1.40
3 0.81 1.83 0.80 1.79 0.75 1.68
4 1.08 2.33 1.04 2.27 0.85 1.81
5 1.00 2.15 1.00 2.13 0.93 1.99
6 1.07 2.24 0.99 2.07 1.02 2.11
7 1.19 2.40 1.14 2.34 1.11 2.28
8 1.12 2.19 1.06 2.05 1.26 2.51
9 1.14 2.21 1.24 2.35 1.32 2.54
High 1.18 2.29 1.29 2.55 1.48 2.98
High - Low 0.71 3.18 0.79 3.61 1.00 4.70
Panel B: Value-weighted Decile Portfolio Excess Return
AIP total t-stat AIP funtl t-stat AIP 10K t-stat
Low 0.40 1.01 0.57 1.60 0.48 1.42
2 0.80 2.01 0.72 1.72 0.59 1.39
3 0.76 1.93 0.86 2.15 0.68 1.61
4 1.04 2.58 0.97 2.35 0.83 2.03
5 0.85 2.09 0.92 2.20 0.99 2.54
6 0.80 2.03 0.89 2.23 0.75 1.83
7 1.00 2.62 0.90 2.38 0.88 2.18
8 0.89 2.26 0.84 2.13 1.01 2.70
9 0.94 2.60 0.87 2.43 0.74 2.04
High 0.71 2.13 0.66 2.01 0.75 2.28
High - Low 0.31 1.23 0.09 0.44 0.26 1.32
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Table 4: Factor adjusted alphas of Portfolios Sorted on Abnormal Number of IPs
This table reports the monthly Carhart (1997) four factor alphas for each of the 10 decile portfolios, as
well as the long-short portfolio (High-Low). AIP total is the residual from a monthly regression of log one
plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for all type of files in EDGAR database on a set of firm
characteristics. Similarly, AIP funtl (AIP 10K) is constructed using number of IPs searching for 10-K, 10-Q
and 8-K filings (10-K) in EDGAR database. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted into deciles
based on their abnormal number of IPs and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying the highest decile
and shorting the lowest decile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next month. Panel A
reports results for equally weighted portfolios and Panel B shows results for value-weighted portfolios. The
sample runs from January 2003 to December 2014.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Decile Portfolio 4-factor alpha
AIP total t-stat AIP funtl t-stat AIP 10K t-stat
Low -0.36 -3.40 -0.32 -2.98 -0.34 -2.84
2 -0.16 -1.77 -0.19 -2.13 -0.33 -3.68
3 -0.15 -2.02 -0.16 -1.79 -0.22 -2.33
4 0.07 0.74 0.04 0.44 -0.18 -2.13
5 -0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.20 -0.09 -1.05
6 0.04 0.46 -0.04 -0.50 -0.02 -0.21
7 0.14 1.33 0.11 0.89 0.08 0.63
8 0.06 0.47 -0.01 -0.10 0.20 1.80
9 0.08 0.56 0.16 1.20 0.27 1.85
High 0.16 0.94 0.29 1.87 0.48 3.30
High - Low 0.52 2.74 0.62 3.33 0.82 4.35
Panel B: Value-weighted Decile Portfolio 4-factor alpha
AIP total t-stat AIP funtl t-stat AIP 10K t-stat
Low -0.40 -2.15 -0.17 -1.05 -0.22 -1.38
2 -0.07 -0.52 -0.20 -1.57 -0.34 -2.69
3 -0.11 -0.96 -0.02 -0.16 -0.25 -2.10
4 0.14 1.27 0.05 0.44 -0.08 -0.72
5 -0.06 -0.52 0.01 0.07 0.13 1.21
6 -0.07 -0.68 0.00 0.03 -0.16 -1.57
7 0.16 1.71 0.07 0.70 -0.01 -0.12
8 0.05 0.43 -0.02 -0.14 0.20 2.40
9 0.15 1.69 0.10 1.19 -0.04 -0.41
High 0.02 0.20 -0.03 -0.32 0.05 0.57
High - Low 0.42 1.79 0.14 0.68 0.27 1.38
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Table 5: Returns and Alphas of Portfolios Sorted on Raw Number of IPs
This table reports the monthly excess returns and Carhart (1997) four factor alphas for decile portfolios
sorted on raw number of IPs searching for Edgar files. At the end of each month, all stocks are sorted
into deciles based on their raw number of IPs and a long-short portfolio is formed by buying the highest
decile and shorting the lowest decile portfolio. Portfolio returns are computed over the next month. Panel
A reports results for equally weighted excess return and Panel B shows results Carhart (1997) four factor
alphas. The sample runs from January 2003 to December 2014.
Panel A: Equal-weighted Decile Portfolio Excess Return
IP total t-stat IP funtl t-stat IP 10K t-stat
Low 0.73 2.17 0.87 2.62 0.73 2.04
2 0.92 2.17 0.80 1.90 0.80 1.87
3 1.01 2.19 0.91 1.89 0.63 1.32
4 1.12 2.22 1.12 2.28 0.95 1.86
5 1.12 2.19 0.89 1.73 1.05 2.01
6 1.07 2.08 1.17 2.23 1.12 2.10
7 1.01 1.92 1.12 2.11 1.12 2.07
8 1.14 2.06 1.05 1.91 1.22 2.25
9 0.99 1.84 1.04 1.96 1.19 2.26
High 0.98 1.99 1.09 2.20 1.10 2.31
High - Low 0.26 1.19 0.22 0.68 0.37 1.58
Panel B: Equal-weighted Decile Portfolio 4-factor alpha
IP total t-stat IP funtl t-stat IP 10K t-stat
Low 0.05 0.30 0.18 1.18 0.04 0.23
2 0.06 0.44 -0.05 -0.39 -0.12 -0.78
3 0.08 0.68 -0.07 -0.54 -0.26 -1.96
4 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.35 -0.08 -0.59
5 0.01 0.08 -0.11 -0.94 -0.08 -0.70
6 -0.09 -0.83 -0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.12
7 -0.09 -0.94 -0.08 -0.96 0.01 0.15
8 -0.11 -1.17 -0.08 -0.73 0.06 0.77
9 -0.13 -1.33 -0.05 -0.49 0.05 0.49
High -0.05 -0.50 -0.02 -0.20 0.13 1.49
High - Low -0.09 -0.56 -0.20 -1.15 0.09 0.47
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Table 6: Two-way sorts on Firm Size and Abnormal Number of IPs
This table reports monthly Carhart (1997) 4-factor alphas (in percentages) sorted on stock’s market
capitalization and abnormal number of IPs searching 10-K files (AIP 10K). AIP 10K is the residual from a
monthly regression of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for 10-K files in EDGAR
database on a set of firm characteristics. At the end of each month, all the stocks are sorted into quintiles
based on NYSE size breakpoints, and within each quintile the stocks are further sorted into quintiles based
on their AIP 10K. We also report, for each size quintile, the high-AIP minus high-AIP portfolio alpha.
Panel A reports resuls on an equal-weighted basis and panel B on a value-weighted basis. The sample runs
from January 2003 to December 2014.
Panel A: Equal-weighted 4 factor alpha
Small firms 2 3 4 Large firms
Low AIP -0.48 -0.22 -0.18 -0.06 -0.22
2 -0.29 -0.14 -0.19 0.02 0.06
3 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 0.02
4 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.15 0.28
High AIP 0.54 -0.12 0.19 0.12 0.23
High-Low 1.03 0.10 0.37 0.19 0.45
t-stat 5.19 0.40 1.95 0.87 2.29
Panel B: Value-weighted 4 factor alpha
Small firms 2 3 4 Large firms
Low AIP -0.57 -0.22 -0.19 -0.08 -0.24
2 -0.35 -0.09 -0.17 0.00 -0.06
3 -0.16 -0.11 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02
4 -0.02 0.08 0.17 0.13 0.05
High AIP 0.36 -0.13 0.22 0.14 0.07
High-Low 0.93 0.09 0.41 0.22 0.31
t-stat 4.66 0.36 2.18 1.01 1.89
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Table 7: Limits to Arbitrage
This table reports results on limits to arbitrage. We sort stocks into tercile based on each limits-to-arbitrage
variable X, including idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), institutional ownership (IO) and analyst coverage
(Coverage). We then independently sort stocks into quintiles based on abnormal number of IPs searching
10-K files (AIP 10K). AIP 10K is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total number of
unique IP addresses searching for 10-K files in Edgar database on a set of firm characteristics. We report
the Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of the lowest and highest AIP portfolio among the lowest and highest
X group. The ”High-Low” column reports Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of the high-AIP minus low-AIP
portfolios. The sample runs from January 2003 to December 2014.
Low AIP 10K High AIP 10K High-Low
High IVOL -0.76 0.48 1.24
(-3.27) (1.95) (4.44)
Low IVOL 0.03 0.27 0.23
(0.30) (3.34) (1.76)
High IO -0.17 0.23 0.40
(-1.61) (1.75) (2.36)
Low IO -0.56 0.48 1.03
(-3.53) (1.91) (4.41)
High Coverage -0.33 0.18 0.51
(-3.08) (1.54) (3.07)
Low Coverage -0.41 0.68 1.10
(-2.59) (3.23) (5.77)
Table 8: Complexity of Financial Filings
This table reports return predictability results on variation in the complexity of financial filings. We
sort stocks into tercile based on the size or number of words of its most recent 10-K filing. We then
independently sort stocks into quintiles based on abnormal number of IPs searching 10-K files (AIP 10K).
AIP 10K is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses
searching for 10-K files in Edgar database on a set of firm characteristics. We report the Carhart (1997)
four-factor alpha of the lowest and highest AIP portfolio among the lowest and highest information cost
group. The ”High-Low” column reports Carhart (1997) four-factor alpha of the high-AIP minus low-AIP
portfolios. The sample runs from January 2003 to December 2014.
Low AIP 10K High AIP 10K High-Low
Large File Size -0.48 0.44 0.92
(-3.98) (2.86) (4.46)
Small File Size -0.29 0.36 0.65
(-2.13) (2.64) (3.51)
More word count -0.48 0.49 0.97
(-4.08) (3.18) (5.06)
Lesser word count -0.36 0.32 0.68
(-3.05) (2.48) (4.21)
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Table 9: Fama-MacBeth Regression: Baseline
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
abnormal number of IPs searching Edgar files (AIP). AIP is the residual from a monthly regression of log
one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for all type of files in EDGAR database on a set of
firm characteristics. Column (1)-(3) use IPs searchings all types of EDGAR filings. Column (4)-(6) uses IPs
searching 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files. Column (7)-(9) looks at IPs searching for 10-K files. Size (LnME) is the
natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM)
is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum
(MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure
(REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions
from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility,
calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Turnover12 is the monthly turnover ratio
averaged over past 12 months. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
All EDGAR Filings 10-K, 10-Q and 8K 10-K
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
AIP 0.0060*** 0.0053*** 0.0050*** 0.0047*** 0.0041*** 0.0042*** 0.0051*** 0.0046*** 0.0044***
(2.68) (2.64) (2.88) (2.70) (2.78) (2.94) (3.73) (3.81) (3.74)
Rev -0.0247*** -0.0283*** -0.0245*** -0.0281*** -0.0247*** -0.0284***
(-3.18) (-3.74) (-3.16) (-3.72) (-3.19) (-3.75)
LnME -0.0006 -0.0014** -0.0006 -0.0014** -0.0006 -0.0014**
(-0.89) (-2.59) (-0.92) (-2.60) (-0.93) (-2.58)
LnBM 0.0019 0.0014 0.0019 0.0013 0.0019 0.0013
(1.64) (1.29) (1.59) (1.24) (1.58) (1.24)
Mom -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0057 -0.0047 -0.0058 -0.0048
(-0.95) (-0.88) (-0.94) (-0.86) (-0.94) (-0.86)
Ivol -0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0007
(-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.01)
Turnover12 -0.0094 -0.0091 -0.0089
(-1.37) (-1.32) (-1.28)
IO 0.0122*** 0.0119*** 0.0114***
(4.00) (3.94) (3.86)
Constant 0.0123** 0.0122 0.0119** 0.0122** 0.0122* 0.0120** 0.0122** 0.0123* 0.0119**
(2.18) (1.65) (2.33) (2.18) (1.66) (2.36) (2.18) (1.67) (2.35)
Ave.R-sq 0.003 0.030 0.046 0.003 0.030 0.046 0.003 0.030 0.046
N.of Obs. 483667 483667 480793 483667 483667 480793 483667 483667 480793
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Table 10: Predicting Long-horizon Returns
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of cumulative returns from
month t + j to t + k on abnormal number of IPs searching 10-K files in EDGAR database (AIP 10K) at
month t. AIP 10K is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total number of unique IP
addresses searching for 10-K files in EDGAR database on a set of firm characteristics. Size (LnME) is the
natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM)
is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum
(MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure
(REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions
from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility,
calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Turnover12 is the monthly turnover ratio
averaged over past 12 months. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Ret(2,4) Ret(5,7) Ret(8,13) Ret(14,25)
AIP 10K 0.0102*** 0.0068** 0.0150 0.0175
(2.95) (2.05) (1.57) (0.64)
Rev -0.0072 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0451
(-0.53) (0.21) (0.11) (-0.93)
LnME -0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0048
(-1.64) (-1.03) (-0.61) (-1.11)
LnBM 0.0046* 0.0041 0.0118** 0.0197*
(1.72) (1.57) (2.36) (1.79)
Mom -0.0193 -0.0117 -0.0300* -0.0421
(-1.24) (-0.88) (-1.75) (-1.26)
Ivol 0.0407 -0.0184 0.2652 0.5759
(0.20) (-0.10) (0.73) (0.84)
Turnover12 -0.0165 -0.0312* -0.0451 -0.0488
(-0.92) (-1.95) (-1.53) (-1.08)
IO 0.0116 0.0152** 0.0414** 0.0956**
(1.63) (2.18) (2.42) (2.47)
Constant 0.0370** 0.0281* 0.0451 0.0947
(2.41) (1.72) (1.53) (1.51)
Ave.R-sq 0.051 0.044 0.036 0.035
N.of Obs. 469185 456068 425505 360584
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Table 11: Which Types of EDGAR Files?
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
abnormal number of IPs searching EDGAR filings (AIP). AIP is the residual from a monthly regression of
log one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for all type of files in Edgar database on a set
of firm characteristics. AIP total use IPs searchings all types of Edgar files. AIP fundl uses IPs searching
10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files. AIP 10K looks at IPs searching for 10-K files. Size (LnME) is the natural log of
a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural
log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM)
is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure (REV) is
the lagged monthly return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from
13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility,
calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Turnover12 is the monthly turnover ratio
averaged over past 12 months. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(1) (2)
AIP total -0.0014 -0.0003
(-0.63) (-0.17)
AIP fundl 0.0022 0.0012
(1.11) (0.70)



















N.of Obs. 483667 480793
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Table 12: Number of IPs or Number of Searches?
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression. Asearch is the residual from
a monthly regression of log one plus total number of EDGAR requests for SEC filings. AIP is the residual
from a monthly regression of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for EDGAR
files on a set of firm characteristics. Column (1)-(2) looks at searching activities for all types of EDGAR
files. Column (3)-(4) look at searching activities for 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files. Column (5)-(6) looks at
searching activities for 10-K files. Size (LnME) is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the
end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The
cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from
month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure (REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional
ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the
total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006). Turnover12 is the monthly turnover ratio averaged over past 12 months. All t-statistics
are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
All EDGAR Files 10K, 10Q, 8K 10K
Asearch 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0020* -0.0024 0.0033*** -0.0039
(1.54) (-0.42) (1.90) (-1.49) (3.93) (-1.57)
AIP 0.0055** 0.0062*** 0.0084***
(2.45) (2.83) (2.90)
Rev -0.0283*** -0.0284*** -0.0283*** -0.0284*** -0.0284*** -0.0289***
(-3.73) (-3.76) (-3.74) (-3.77) (-3.75) (-3.75)
LnME -0.0014** -0.0014*** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0014*** -0.0013***
(-2.59) (-2.63) (-2.61) (-2.52) (-2.64) (-3.11)
LnBM 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0012 0.0015*
(1.26) (1.31) (1.34) (1.36) (1.13) (1.71)
Mom -0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0048 -0.0049
(-0.89) (-0.88) (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.86) (-1.15)
Ivol 0.0048 -0.0014 0.0065 -0.0033 0.0039 -0.0021
(0.07) (-0.02) (0.09) (-0.05) (0.05) (-0.03)
Turnover12 -0.0100 -0.0096 -0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0095 -0.0088
(-1.46) (-1.39) (-1.38) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.33)
IO 0.0127*** 0.0123*** 0.0122*** 0.0115*** 0.0120*** 0.0109***
(4.10) (4.04) (4.06) (3.86) (4.03) (3.57)
Constant 0.0115** 0.0120** 0.0116** 0.0119** 0.0117** 0.0120***
(2.26) (2.35) (2.29) (2.33) (2.32) (3.19)
Ave.R-sq 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.048 0.046 0.049
N.of Obs. 480793 480793 480793 480793 480793 480793
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Table 13: Predicting Fundamental Performance
This table reports the results from panel regression of future fundamental performance measure on abnormal
number of IPs searching 10K files in Edgar database at month t. AIP is the residual from a monthly
regression of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for EDGAR filings on a set of firm
characteristics. The dependent variable in Column (1)-(3) are change of quarterly Return-on-Assets from
four quarters ago. The dependent variable in Column (4)-(6) are monthly revision of analysts consensus
annual EPS forecast. Size (LnME) is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the
June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with
negative book value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month
t-12 to t-2. Coverage is log one plus analyst coverage. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares
held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL is the
idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). We control year-quarter
fixed effect in Column (1)-(3) and year-month fixed effect in Column (4)-(6). Turnover12 is the monthly
turnover ratio averaged over past 12 months. Standard errors are double clustered at both firm and time
level. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Change of ROA Forecast Revision
AIP total AIP fundl AIP 10K AIP total AIP fundl AIP 10K
AIP 0.0017* 0.0026** 0.0028*** 0.0007*** 0.0016*** 0.0019***
(1.96) (2.51) (2.92) (2.78) (6.19) (5.28)
LROA -0.3425*** -0.3428*** -0.3430***
(-4.71) (-4.73) (-4.74)
LnME 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005
(1.27) (1.31) (1.33) (-1.51) (-1.55) (-1.63)
LnBM -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0008** -0.0008** -0.0009**
(-0.87) (-0.84) (-0.83) (-2.37) (-2.39) (-2.47)
Mom 0.0100*** 0.0099*** 0.0100*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0025***
(3.55) (3.56) (3.57) (5.20) (5.14) (5.18)
Coverage 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021***
(0.29) (0.31) (0.32) (3.30) (3.29) (3.28)
Turnover12 -0.0118** -0.0117** -0.0117** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** -0.0082***
(-2.43) (-2.42) (-2.43) (-3.15) (-3.16) (-3.17)
IO -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0049*** 0.0051*** 0.0052***
(-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.61) (5.47) (5.61) (5.73)
Ivol -0.0777 -0.0773 -0.0775 -0.1111** -0.1115** -0.1138**
(-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.42) (-2.35) (-2.37) (-2.41)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Adj.R-sq 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.002 0.002 0.002
N.of Obs. 128504 128504 128504 348130 348130 348130
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Table 14: Mutual Fund Outflows Induced Mispricing and Abnormal Number of
IPs
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of quarterly change of abnormal
number of IPs searching EDGAR files on quarterly mutual fund outflows. Outflows is calculated following
Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012). AIP is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total
number of unique IP addresses searching for EDGAR filings on a set of firm characteristics. dAIP equals
the within-firm change in AIP in the quarter around mutual fund outflows. LnME is the natural log of
firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year in millions of US dollars. Coverage is log one
plus analyst coverage. Turnover12 is the monthly turnover ratio averaged over the past 12 months. IVOL
is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Book-to-market
(LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted.
Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. Institutional ownership
(IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares
outstanding. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
dAIP total dAIP funtl dAIP 10K
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outflows -2.4242*** -1.7256*** -1.9145*** -1.3527*** -1.9303** -1.5459**
(-4.02) (-4.92) (-3.36) (-3.27) (-2.06) (-2.31)
LnME -0.0091*** -0.0094*** -0.0093***
(-6.03) (-5.68) (-5.81)
LnBM 0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0017
(0.56) (-0.57) (-0.75)
Coverage 0.0080*** 0.0076*** 0.0087***
(4.50) (4.28) (3.70)
Ivol -1.8233*** -1.9963*** -1.8354***
(-6.48) (-7.68) (-6.19)
Turnover12 -0.0015 0.0158 0.0203
(-0.09) (1.13) (1.56)
IO -0.0023 -0.0141** -0.0143**
(-0.36) (-2.54) (-2.28)
Mom -0.0336*** -0.0370*** -0.0398***
(-5.17) (-5.70) (-7.68)
Constant 0.0007 0.0901*** 0.0050** 0.1036*** 0.0049** 0.0967***
(0.29) (7.79) (2.09) (8.54) (2.06) (6.54)
Ave.R-sq 0.001 0.031 0.001 0.034 0.001 0.026
N.of Obs. 131863 131041 131863 131041 131863 131041
51
Table 15: Information Acquisition and Institutional Trading
This table reports Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of institutional trading at quarter q on abnormal
number of IPs searching EDGAR filings (AIP) at quarter q − 1. The dependent variable in Column (1)-(3)
is net buying by hedge fund in that quarter. The dependent variable in Column (4)-(6) is net buying by
mutual funds in that quarter. AIP is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total number
of unique IP addresses searching for all type of files in EDGAR database on a set of firm characteristics.
Column (1) and (4) use IPs searchings all types of EDGAR filings. Column (2) and (5) uses IPs searching
10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files. Column (3) and (6) looks at IPs searching for 10-K files. Size (LnME) is the
natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each year. Book-to-market (LnBM)
is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book value are deleted. Momentum
(MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The short term reversal measure
(REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of shares held by institutions
from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility,
calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Turnover12 is the monthly turnover ratio
averaged over past 12 months. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Net Buying by Hedge Funds Net Buying by Mutual Funds
AIP total AIP funtl AIP 10K AIP total AIP funtl AIP 10K
AIP 0.0053** 0.0043** 0.0034** 0.0030 0.0046 0.0065
(2.45) (2.43) (2.27) (0.52) (0.77) (1.00)
Lagged Holding -0.1245*** -0.1234*** -0.1218*** -0.1557*** -0.1569*** -0.1573***
(-7.62) (-7.72) (-9.24) (-3.91) (-3.83) (-3.77)
LnME -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
(-3.37) (-3.39) (-4.12) (-1.07) (-1.08) (-1.06)
LnBM -0.0002* -0.0002* -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003
(-1.88) (-1.74) (-1.64) (0.32) (0.38) (0.34)
Cov -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0005
(-1.40) (-1.33) (-1.51) (-0.30) (-0.26) (-0.22)
Ivol 0.0145 0.0153 0.0164 -0.1965* -0.1975* -0.2012*
(0.76) (0.80) (0.97) (-1.96) (-1.94) (-1.95)
Turnover12 0.0041* 0.0042* 0.0044** -0.0069** -0.0068** -0.0064**
(1.76) (1.78) (2.23) (-2.04) (-2.22) (-2.38)
IO 0.0150*** 0.0145*** 0.0140*** 0.0739*** 0.0736*** 0.0728***
(3.09) (3.14) (3.87) (2.86) (2.90) (2.92)
Mom 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0066*** 0.0067*** 0.0065***
(1.14) (1.22) (0.97) (6.44) (6.29) (7.74)
Constant 0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0069*** 0.0048* 0.0050* 0.0053*
(4.06) (4.01) (4.68) (1.95) (1.91) (1.96)
Ave.R-sq 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.113 0.113 0.113




Table A1: Robustness of Decile Portfolio Sorts
This table reports several robustness tests for a long/short portfolio based on abnormal number of IPs
searching for 10-K files in EDGAR database (AIP 10K). AIP 10K is the residual from a monthly regression
of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for 10-K files in EDGAR database on a set of
firm characteristics. In the first set of robustness tests, we report the gross return-weighted portfolio returns
in which the weights are 1 + the stock’s lagged monthly return, following Asparouhova, Bessembinder, and
Kalcheva (2013). The second robustness test show the portfolio returns adjusted using DGTW method.
The third set of robustness tests shows the Fama-French 48 industry-adjusted excess return. The fourth
row shows the alpha using Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor augmented with the Fama-French
factors and the momentum factor. In the fifth set of tests, we report the alphas using the Fama and French
(2016) Five Factor model. In the sixth and seventh set of tests, we report the alphas using the Stambaugh
and Yuan (2016) Mispricing Factors model and the Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) Q-factor model. In the
eighth set of analyses, we exclude stocks whose market capitalization are in the bottom quintile based on
NYSE size breakpoints. In the ninth panel, we skip six months between the moment at abnormal IP is
constructed and the moment at which we start measuring returns. In the tenth and eleventh row, we report
the 4-factor alpha for two sub-sample periods, one from 2003 to 2008 and another from 2009 to 2014.
EW VW
Gross return-weighed portfolio 1.096 NA
(5.16)
DGTW adjusted 0.910 0.410
(4.51) (2.22)
FF48 Industry-adjusted 0.739 0.155
(3.26) (1.16)
FF + Cahart + PS Factor 0.800 0.348
(4.23) (1.78)
FF five factor (2015) 0.685 0.248
(3.36) (1.19)
Mispricing factors (Stambaugh and Yuan 2017) 0.892 0.276
(4.42) (1.35)
Q-factor (Hou, Xue and Zhang 2015) 0.897 0.183
(4.66) (0.87)
Remove microcap stocks 0.518 0.276
(2.58) (1.35)







Table A2: Alternative Implementations of AIP
This table reports several alternative implementations of AIP 10K when calculating long/short portfolio
Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha. AIP 10K is the residual from a monthly regression of log one plus total
number of unique IP addresses searching for 10-K files in EDGAR database on a set of firm characteristics.
In the first row, we calculate AIP 10K using model (7) of equation 2. In the second row, we sort portfolios
based on changes in AIP 10K relative to its 12-month moving average. In the third row, we also include the
square term of the four firm charteristics when calculating AIP. In the fourth row, we include lagged number
of IPs in expected IP regression. Column (1) reports the results for equal-weighted portfolio, and Column
(2) reports for the value-weighted portfolio. The sample runs from January 2003 to December 2014.
EW VW
Model (7) of Expected IP Regression 0.658 0.156
(3.95) (0.82)
Change in AIP relative to 12 months average 0.883 0.388
(4.82) (1.44)
Nonlinear functional form of Expected IP Regression 0.689 0.552
(4.30) (2.39)
Control for lagged # of IPs in Expected IP Regression 0.698 0.508
(5.44) (2.03)
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Table A3: Fama-MacBeth Regression: Controllling for Earnings Surprise, Earn-
ings Announcement Premium and Change of Breadth of Ownership
This table reports the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of monthly stock returns on
abnormal number of IPs searching EDGAR filings (AIP). AIP is the residual from a monthly regression
of log one plus total number of unique IP addresses searching for all type of files in EDGAR site on a set
of firm characteristics. Column (1) and (4) use IPs searchings all types of EDGAR filings. Column (2)
and (5) uses IPs searching 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K files. Column (3) and (6) looks at IPs searching for 10-K
files. SUE is a firm’s standardized unexplained earnings, defined as the realized earnings per share (EPS)
minus EPS from four quarters prior, divided by the standard deviation of this difference over the prior eight
quarters. EAM is a dummy variable that equals one when a given firm announces earnings in the month.
dBreadth is the percentage change of breadth of 13F institutional ownership, following Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2002). Size (LnME) is the natural log of a firm’s market capitalization at the end of the June of each
year. Book-to-market (LnBM) is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio. The cases with negative book
value are deleted. Momentum (MOM) is defined as the cumulative returns from month t-12 to t-2. The
short term reversal measure (REV) is the lagged monthly return. Institutional ownership (IO) is the sum of
shares held by institutions from 13F filings in each quarter divided by the total shares outstanding. IVOL
is the idiosyncratic volatility, calculated following Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Turnover12 is the
monthly turnover ratio averaged over past 12 months. All t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted to control
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AIP total AIP fundl AIP 10K AIP total AIP fundl AIP 10K
AIP 0.0057*** 0.0047*** 0.0044*** 0.0056*** 0.0046*** 0.0044***
(3.31) (3.32) (4.02) (3.29) (3.27) (3.97)
Rev -0.0300*** -0.0298*** -0.0300*** -0.0299*** -0.0297*** -0.0299***
(-4.08) (-4.06) (-4.09) (-4.10) (-4.08) (-4.10)
LnME -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0016***
(-3.13) (-3.16) (-3.14) (-3.13) (-3.16) (-3.15)
LnBM 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016
(1.56) (1.51) (1.53) (1.57) (1.51) (1.54)
Mom -0.0065 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0068 -0.0067 -0.0067
(-1.13) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.17)
Ivol 0.0116 0.0104 0.0121 0.0077 0.0063 0.0083
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Turnover12 -0.0097 -0.0093 -0.0092 -0.0093 -0.0089 -0.0088
(-1.38) (-1.32) (-1.29) (-1.33) (-1.27) (-1.24)
IO 0.0118*** 0.0114*** 0.0109*** 0.0118*** 0.0114*** 0.0109***
(3.42) (3.35) (3.26) (3.43) (3.36) (3.27)
SUE 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(8.36) (8.39) (8.46) (8.29) (8.31) (8.37)
EAM 0.0032** 0.0034** 0.0027** 0.0032** 0.0033** 0.0027**
(2.51) (2.59) (2.23) (2.48) (2.56) (2.19)
dBreadth 0.0710 0.0789 0.0842
(0.95) (1.05) (1.13)
Constant 0.0121** 0.0122** 0.0122** 0.0121** 0.0123** 0.0123**
(2.46) (2.49) (2.50) (2.42) (2.46) (2.47)
Ave.R-sq 0.051 0.051 0.051 0.052 0.052 0.052
N.of Obs. 443261 443261 443261 442794 442794 442794
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